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CAN tell when he walks in the door what sort of a day it's been," says his wife, Cynthia. "Some days he has on what I call his 'Oriental look'—totally inscrutable. I know better than to ask what's happened. He'll talk when he's ready, not before, but even when he talks he's terribly discreet."

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, apparently brings his problems home from the office like any other husband—at least to hear Cynthia Helms tell it. And these days Helms's job is definitely one of the most problem-ridden in Washington.

Successive budget cuts, balance of payments restrictions, bureaucratic rivalries and press disclosures that have hurt the C.I.A.'s public image have all reduced its operations considerably. President Nixon has recently ordered a fiscal and management investigation into the intelligence "community," a task which may take longer and prove more difficult than even Nixon suspects because of the capacity of the intelligence agencies to hide in the bureaucratic thickets. Both Nixon and his principal foreign affairs adviser,

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Henry Kissinger, are said to regard the community as a mixed blessing: intrinsically important to the United States but far too big and too prone to obscure differences of opinion—or, sometimes, no opinion—behind a screen of words.

Considered a cold-blooded necessity in the Cold War days, the agency now seems to many students, liberal intellectuals and Congressmen, to be undemocratic, conspiratorial, sinister. The revelations in recent years that have made the agency suspect include its activities in Southeast Asia, the Congo, Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs; the U-2 flights; its secret funding through "front" foundations of the National Student Association plus private cultural, women's and lawyers' groups, and, finally, two years ago, the Green Berets affair.

The 58-year-old Helms, now 58, is, better than most. As the first career intelligence officer to reach the

top since the C.I.A. was created in 1947, his goal has been to professionalize the agency and restore it to respectability. In fact, one of his chief preoccupations has been to erase the image of the Director as a man who moves in lonely mystery, jettisoning secretively around the world to make policy with prime ministers, generals and kings, and brushing aside, on the pretext of "security," the public's vague fears and Congress's probing questions. If Helms rules an "invisible empire," as the C.I.A. has sometimes been called, he is a very visible emperor.

While he tries to keep his lunches free for work, for example, he occasionally shows up at a restaurant with a friend for lunch: a light beer, a cold plate, one eye always on the clock. He prefers the Occidental, a tourist-frequented restaurant near the White House where, if he happens to be seen, there is likely to be less gossip than if he were observed entering a private home.

He likes the company of attractive women—young or old—and they find him a charming dinner partner and a good dancer.

"He's interesting—and interested in what you're saying," said Lydia Katzenbach, wife of the former Democratic Attorney General. "He's well-read and he doesn't try to substitute flirting for conversation, that old Princeton '43 routine that some of the columnists around town use."

Some of his critics complain that he is too close to the press—even though most agree that he uses it, with rare finesse, for his own and his agency's ends. Some dislike the frequent mention of Helms and his handsome wife in the gossip columns and society pages of the nation's capital.

Yet, if he gives the appearance of insouciance—he is witty, gregarious, friendly—the reserve is there, like a high-voltage electric barrier, just beneath the surface. Helms is a mass of apparent contradictions: inwardly self-disciplined and outwardly relaxed, absorbed in the essential yet fascinated by the trivial. A former foreign correspondent, he observes much and can recall precisely what few Americans do. He knows the place—what gown each woman wore to a dinner and whose shoulder strap

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# Noyes urges ASIA members to guard their perspective

By Luther Huston

Newspaper editors must achieve a more serious, more sophisticated perspective on their jobs. Revise their basic concept of news and quit being "suckers" for either side of the proponents of change, Newbold Noyes, president of The American Society of Newspaper Editors, told several hundred editors at the opening session of the society's annual convention in Washington April 14.

"The newspapers," said Noyes, who is editor of the *Washington (D.C.) Star*, "are not exactly writing a glorious chapter" in the history of the profession and have "a good deal to answer for at the bar of public opinion."

If the reader confidence in the newspaper press is at a low ebb it is because "we are lazy and superficial in much of our reporting" and fail to give readers the information and understanding that will "permit them to sort out the forces at work in society and to decide where their true interests lie."

After Noyes' keynote speech, the society adopted a report of its freedom of information committee which recommended enactment of a National Shield Law to protect newsmen from disclosing confidential information or the sources of such information: agreed to let Congress know that it opposed efforts of the Stagers subcommittee to subpoena Columbia Broadcasting Systems and transcripts of its documentary on "The Selling of the Pentagon"; voted against a proposal to establish national press councils but authorized formation of an ad hoc committee to select some specific ethical violation by a newspaper and conduct a "dry run" trial to see how the press council idea might work.

Noyes criticized the press for maintaining stereo-typed standards of news coverage. "Not only do we devote 80 per cent of our time and space to stereo-typed happenings, but we also insist these happenings are newsworthy only if they meet certain stereotyped standards". Noyes said, "there is no story in a speech or a press conference or what have you unless it involves conflict or surprise. Before a situation is worthy of

our attention, it must burst to the surface in some disruptive, exceptional (and hence newsworthy) event. Even when we know what is happening under the surface, we are forever waiting for a traditional news peg to hang the story on. What are we thinking of, sticking to such old-fashioned concepts in a time of revolutionary movement? If we have so little faith in the intelligence of our readers, how can we expect them to have faith in us? No wonder the readers constantly feel that events are overwhelming them, unawares." Newsmen, Noyes said, are not "merely spectators on the unfolding scene." We are the people who must decide what is worthy of public attention and who must determine the way it is to be presented. The difficulty of this task has made it convenient for us to hide behind simplistic, even childish formulas as to what is news, the simplest and most childish being that this, after all, is what people naturally want to read."

New techniques must be developed that will permit newspapers to convey to readers the truest possible picture of what transpires, Noyes asserted. He acknowledged that he did not know what these techniques are but told the editors that "we must grow up, must change, because our readers are changing and growing up. They are demanding more of us now, and they are entitled to more from us than what they are getting."

"Change we must have," Noyes went on, "but the trick is to give our readers a basis, factual and intellectual, for assessing the paths of change into which they are being pushed, form rational choices while the choice is still theirs."

"I think the worst of our lazy and superficial performance today is that we of the press are allowing ourselves to be manipulated by various interests—some for change and some against it—some powerfully in support of the system, some destructively seeking to tear it down—all clever in the ways of their manipulation. Our nervousness, our laziness, our superficiality, our gullibility. No

doubt the Pentagon makes suckers of but no more easy New Left does. We to me, tragically, develop for our readers a false and misleading perspective of such special events. In the first published by the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms told the American Society of Newspaper Editors that the work criticized CIA is "permit this country in a fearsome world its way into a better peaceful one."

"We are, after all, this democracy, and in it," Helms, a former and advertising man, said. "We would not let our work distort and its principles. to adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa."

Helms said that the quality of foreign intelligence available to the United States government in 1971 is better than it has ever been before. He said that the "intelligence community—a name for all of the intelligence assets at the disposal of the United States, comprised the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence components of the various armed services, the National Security Agency, the intelligence elements of Department of State and—when appropriate, those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission." All of these agencies are represented on the United States Intelligence Board, chaired by the director of Central Intelligence, not as head of the CIA, but as the principal intelligence adviser to the president and the National Security Council.

"By necessity" Helms said, "intelligence organizations do not publish the extent of their knowledge and they do not challenge criticism of their operations. We answer to those we serve in government."

The CIA, he said, is the only one of the organizations named

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many to manufacture a special kind of report for a very few."

Helms gave a detailed report of the CIA's part in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. He cited the agencies success in disproving various reports, such as that light bombers were being stored in a particular cave and that what was reported as a rounded dome covering missiles was actually a relatively new movie theatre in Havana.

"Our intelligence files in Washington, however—thanks to U-2 photography of the Soviet Union and to a number of well-placed and courageous Russians who helped—included a wealth of information on Soviet missile systems. We had descriptions or photographs of the missiles, their transporters and other associated equipment and characteristic sites in the Soviet Union. We knew what to look for."

"Guided by this background, the interrogators were able to sort out from the flood of reports the ones which established the arrival of MRBM and IRBM equipment in Cuba. We were then able to locate the sites under construction and tell President Kennedy the exact scope of the threat."

The CIA's efforts to obtain foreign intelligence in this country, Helms said, "have generated one of the most virulent criticisms of the agency. They have led to charges that

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